No 87-1167 Brief of Amici Curiae Now Legal Defense and Education Fund American Civil Liberties Union Women\u27s Legal Defense Fund... by Supreme Court of the United States
Hollins University 
Hollins Digital Commons 
Ann B. Hopkins Papers Manuscript Collections 
10-1987 
No 87-1167 Brief of Amici Curiae Now Legal Defense and 
Education Fund American Civil Liberties Union Women's Legal 
Defense Fund... 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
No. 87-1167 
INTHE 
@>upr.em.e OLnurt nf tlt.e Nutt.eh @,tat.es 




ANN B. HOPKINS, 
Respondent. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION 
FUND, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE 
FUND, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, EMPLOY-
MENT LAW CENTER, EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES, INC., GREATER 
WASHINGTON AREA CHAPTER, WOMEN LAWYERS DIVISION, NA-
TIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN'S 
HEALTH, NADINE TAUB, NATIONAL COALITION FOR WOMEN'S MEN-
TAL HEALTH, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIA-
TIONS, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, NATIONAL WOMEN'S 
LAW CENTER, NORTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, ORGANIZATION 
OF PAN ASIAN-AMERICAN WOMEN, SAN FRANCISCO WOMEN LAWYERS 
ALLIANCE, WOMEN EMPLOYED, WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATION OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA, WOMEN'S EQUITY ACTION LEAGUE 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
DONNA R. LENHOFF 
CLAUDIA A. WITHERS 
Women's Legal Defense Fund 
2000 P Street, NW-Suite 400 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 887-0364 
Of Counsel 
Date: June 18, 1988 
*Counsel of Record 
SARAH E. BURNS* 
LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN 
NOW Legal Defense 
and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street-12th Floor 
(212) 925-6635 and 
1333 H Street, NW-11th Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-0940 
JOANE. BERTIN 
JOHN A. POWELL 
American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation 
132 West 43 Street 
New York, New York 10036 
(212) 944-9800 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....•........... i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........•. iii 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ......... 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT •••.•....•.... 2 
INTRODUCTION ........•••.••....•.. 5 
I. The Record is Replete with 
Evidence of Intentional Sex 
Discrimination, Both Direct 
and Circumstantial ........•.. 22 
II. The Direct Evidence of Sex 
Discrimination Here Establishes 
Liability Under Title VII 
and Requires that the Burden 
Shift to Defendant to Show 
that No Relief Should be 
Granted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
A. With Direct Evidence of 
Intentional Sex Discrim-
ination a Title VII 
Violation is Shown •••••. 38 
B. The Burden-shifting 
Formulation of Burdine 
and McDonnell Douglas 
is Inappropriate Here ... 46 
- i -
c. Where the Plaintiff 
has Proved that the 
Employment Decision 
Was Tainted by Discrim-
ination, The Purposes 
of Title VII Can Be 
Served Only by Requiring 
the Defendant to Meet 
a Clear and Convincing 
Evidentiary Standard 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 53 
CONCLUSION . • . . . . • • . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . 64 
APPENDIX 
- ii -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: PAGE 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
( 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 
422 U.S. 405 (1975) ••.....•••••.• 54 
Alexander v. Louisiana., 405 U.S. 
625 ( 1972)....................... 39 
Baxter v. Savannah Refining Corp., 
495 F.2d 437 (5th cir.) cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974)..... 62 
Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 
715 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984) 49, so, 
52, 53 
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318 
(8th Cir. 1985) ••••••••.••..••••. 29, 52, 
53 
Broderick v. Ruder, No 86-1834, 
slip op.(D.D.C. May 13, 1988) •.•• 30 
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) ................. 30, 59 
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 
(1978)........................... 40, 44 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482 ( 1977) . • . • • . • • . . . . • • • . • . . . • . • 39 
- iii -
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of 
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702 (1978) •..•.••.....••••.. 
Coble v. Hot Springs School 




Cir. 19 8 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 
( 19 8 2 ) . . . . • . . . . . • • • • • • • • • . . • • • . . . 25 
Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, U.S. 
, 10 7 S • Ct. 2 7 4 ( 19 8 6) • . • • . • . • 62 
Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. 
Board, 731 F.2d 465 (1984) ••..••• 27, 62 
Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) •.••••••••••..•.. 27 
Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ...•.••••••...••• 27, 53, 
58, 59, 
60 
EEOC v. FLC & Brothers Rebel, 
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. Va. 
1987) ............................ 29 
Fadhl v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th 
Cir.), aff'd after remand, 804 
F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1984) •.•.••• 29, 53 
Fields v. Clarke Univ., 817 F.2d 





Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 
424 U.S. 747 (1976) .........•.... 41 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 ( 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 
{ 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7, 48, 
49 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 
( 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125 (1976) .•.••..••..... 63 
Gilchrest v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 
1551 (11th Cir. 1984) ••......•••. 60 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 
F.2d 113 (3rd Cir. 1985) aff'd, 
u.s. , 101 s.ct. 2617 
( 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424 (1971) ••••......•....••.•••.. 55 
Haskins v. Department of the Army, 
808 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, u.s. , 108 s.ct. 68 
(1987) ........................... 53 
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 
( 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
459 U.S. 375 (1983) ......•..•.•.. 56 
- V -
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 
U.S. 59 (1984) .••................
 33, 57 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 
F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985)......
 passim 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 
F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
granted, __ u.s. __ , 108 s.ct. 
1106 ( 1988) . • • . • . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . 
22, 29 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 
(1985) ..........................
. 44 
International Brotherhood of Team
-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324 ( 1977).......................
 37, 38 
39 t 40 
Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ••••••..••••..... 
59 
King v. Trans World Airlines, 738
 
F. 2 d 2 5 5 (8th Cir. 19 8 4) • • • • • • • . . 
4 2 
Knighton v. Laurens County School
 
Dist. No. 56, 721 F.2d 976 (4th 
Cir. 19 8 3) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • 6 0 
League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. City of Salinas Fire 
Dep't, 654 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 
1981}............................ 
42, 62 
Lee v. Russell County Bd. of 
Educ., 684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 
1982) ..........................
.. 50 
Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 







Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 
725 F.2d 910 (3rd Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) 53 
Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 
1003 (1st Cir. 1979) •..••••...•.. 51 
Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615 
(9th Cir. 1980) •.••...••••....•.. 60 
McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Trans. 
Corp., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) •••.... 43 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973) ...••..••..•.. 




(D.C. Cir. 1982) ••.••..•...••.••• 62 
McOuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. 
Assoc. Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th 
cir. 1987), cert. denied, U.S. 
__ , 108 S.Ct. 1068 (1988r:-:- .•.. 53 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)....... 30, 63 
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 
8 6 7 ( 11th Cir . 19 8 5 ) • • • • • • . . . . • • . 5 0 
Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) ..•.•.........•.. 59 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)....... 32 
Mt. Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274 (1977) .•...•......•. 44 
- vii -
Muntin v. State of Cal. Parks & 
Recreation Dep't, 671 F.2d 360 
(9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 738 F.2d 
1054 (1984)...................... 51, 60 
NLRB v. Transportation Management 
Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)....... 41, 51 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).. 32 
Patterson v. Greenwood School 
Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 
1982) . ·........................... 61 
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)...... 44, 45 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 
400 U.S. 542 (1971) •••••••.•..••• 31, 33, 
35 
Price v. Denison Independent 
School Dist., 694 F.2d 334 (5th 
Cir. 1982)....................... 62 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)....... 40 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984) ..•..••••....• 32 
Smallwood v. United Airlines, 728 
F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 469 U. s. 832 ( 1984) . . . • . • 53 
Terbowitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair 
County. Ky., 825 F.2d 111 {6th Cir. 







Texas Deg't of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) •• 46, 
48, 
51, 
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 
726 F. 2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984). 29 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 
(D.C. Cir.1983) .................. 42, 
57, 
Trans World Airlines, ~nc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985) .... 48 
United States v. New York, N.H. 
& Hartford R.R., 355 U.S. 253 
(1957) ........................... 52 
United states Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 
( 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metrogolitan Housing Dev. Corg., 
429 U.S. 252 (1977) ........•••••. 43 






(1976) .......................... 44, 55 
STATUTES: 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 
Stat. 2076 (1978) •.••...••.••..•. 55 
Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e 
et seq.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 
- ix -
ADMINISTRATIVE SOURCE MATERIALS 
EEOC Remedial Actions, 29 C.F.R. 
§1613.271 (1980) .•.....••...•.... 63 
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS 
H.R. No. 899, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 
1 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 
(Legislative History of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972)......................... 31 
110 Cong. Rec. 13,088 (1964) 
(Statement of Sen. Humphrey).... 37 
110 Cong. Rec. 13,837 (1964) 
(Statement of Sen. Case)........ 37, 43 
110 Cong. Rec. 13,838........... 43 
OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
c. McCormick, Evidence §337 
( 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Taub, Keeping Women in Their 
Place: stereotyping Per Se as a 
Form of Employment Discrimina-




G. Allport, The Nature of Pre-
judice (1954).................... 12 
Billig & Tajfel, Social Categor-









group Behavior, 3 European J. 
Soc. Psych. 27 (1973) ..........•• 14 
H. Blalock, Causal Inferences in 
Nonexperimental Research (1964) •. 28 
Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, 
Clarkson and Rosenkrantz, 
Sex Role Stereotypes: 
A Current Appraisal, 28 
J. of Social Issues 59 (1972) .•.. 18, 19 
Campbell, Enhancement of 
Contrast as a Composite 
Habit, 53 J. Abnormal & 
Social Psych. 350 
( 1956)........................... 13 
Crocker & McGraw, What's Good 
for the Goose is Not Good for 
the Gander, 27 Am. Behav. Scien-
tist 357 (1984) ..••.•••.•..•..•.• 16 
Deaux, Sex: A Perspective on 
the Attribution Process, in 
New Directions in Attribution 
Research (J. Harvey, w. Ickes 
& K. Kidel, eds. 1976) .•.•••...•. 16 
K. Deaux, The Behavior of Women 
and Men(1976) ..•••.......••..•... 16 
s. Fiske ands. Taylor, Social 
Cognition (1984) ..•.••••.•••••••• 
Fiske and Neuberg, A Continuum 
of Impression Formation from 
Category-Based to Individuating 
Processes: Influences of 




on Attention and Inter 
pretation, in 23 Advances 
in Experimental Interpretation 
(M. Zanna ed. 1988) ...•.......... 22 
Hamilton, et al., The Emotional 
Consequences of Gender-Based 
Abuse in the Workplace, 6 Women 
and Therapy 155 (1987) .•......... 35 
Hamilton & Gifford, Illusory 
Correlation, Correlation in 
Interpersonal Perception: A 
Cognitive Basis of Stereo-
typic Judgments, 12 J. Exp. 
Soc. Psych. 392 (1976) ...•...•... 14 
Hansen & O'Leary, Actresses 
and Actors: The Effect of 
Sex on Causal Attributions, 
4 Basic and Applied Soc. Psych. 
209 ( 1984) . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • . . • . . . • • 16 
Heilman, Sex Bias in Work 
Settings: The Lack of Fit 
Model, in 5 Research in 
Organizational Behavior 269 
(B. Staw & L. Cummings eds. 
1983)............................ 8, 15, 
Heilman, The Impact of Situ-
ational Factors on Personnel 
Decisions Concerning Women: 
Varying the Sex Composition 
of the Applicant Pool, 26 Org. 
Behav. and Hum. Perf. 386 
22 
(1980) ........................... 16 
N. Henley, Body Politics 197 
(1977) ........................... 19 
- xii -
Hitt and Zikmund, Forewarned 
is Forearmed: Potential Between 
and Within Sex Discrimination, 
12 Sex Roles 807 ( 1985) • . • • . • . . . . . 15 
"How Tom Mitchell Lays out The 
Competition," Fortune, March 30, 
1987 at 91....................... 20 
"A Humble Hero Drives Ford To The 
Top," Fortune, January 4, 1988 at 
2 3 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 0 
R. Kanter, Men and Women of the 
corporation (1977) .....•.....•••. 16 
Kirkpatrick, Speech to the 
Women's Forum, 5 News for Women 
in Psychiatry 14 (Oct. 1986) .•... 10 
A. Morrison, R. White & E. 
Van Velsor, Breaking the 
Glass Ceiling: can Women 
Reach the Top of America's 
Largest Corporations? 
( 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 19 
V. Nieva & B. Gutek, Women 
and Work: A Psychological 
Perspective 59 (1982) •.....•.••••. 8, 19 
Pettigrew, The Ultimate 
Attribution Error: 
Extending Allport's Cognitive 
Analysis of Prejudice, 
5 Pers. & Soc. Psych. Bull. 
461 (1979)....................... 12 
Rosen, Career Progress of 
Women: Getting In and 
- xiii -
Staying In in Women in the 
Workforce 70 (H. Bernardin ed. 
1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Rosen and Jerdee, Influence 
of Sex Role Stereotypes 
on Personnel Decisions, 59 
J. App. Psych. 9 (1974).......... 15 
Ruble, Sex Stereotypes Issues 
of Change in the 1970's, 
9 Sex Roles 397 ( 1983) • . . . • . • . • • • 18 
Ruble, Cohen and Ruble, 
Sex Stereotypes: Occupational 
Barriers for Women, 27 Arn. Behav. 
Scientist 329 (1984) •.••....•.... 22, 23 
E. Schur, Labeling Women 
Deviant: Gender, Stigma, 
and Social Control (1983) •.••••.•. 8, 19 
Spangler, Gordon & Pipken, 
Token Women: An Empirical 
Test of the Kanter Hypothesis, 
8 4 Arn. J. Soc. 16 o ( 19 7 8) . . . • • • • . 16 
Tajfel, Sheikh & Gardner, 
Content of Stereotypes and 
the Inference of Similarity 
Between Members of Stereotyped 
Groups, 22 Acta Psychologica 
191 (1964)....................... 13 
Tajfel & Billig, Familiarity 
and Categorization in 
Intergroup Behavior, 
10 J. Exp. Soc. Psych. 159 
( 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
- xiv -
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & 
Flament, Social Categorization 
and Intergroup Behavior, 
1 European J. Soc. Psych. 
149 (1971) ....................... 14 
Taylor, A Categorization 
Approach to stereotyping in 
Cognitive Processes in 
stereotyping and Intergroup 
Behavior 83 (D. Hamilton ed. 
1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13, 
c. Tavris & c. Wade, The Longest 
War: sex Differences in Per-
14, 16, 
17 
spective 265 (2d ed. 1984) ••..... 8 
"The Toughest Bosses in America," 
Fortune, August 6, 1984 at 18 •... 20 
The Trapped Woman: Catch-22 
in Deviance and Control 206-208 
(J. Figueira-McDonough & R. Sarri 
eds • 19 8 7 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • 8 
E. Webb, D. Campbell, 
R. Schwartz and L. Sechrest, 
Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive 
Research in the Social Sciences 
(1966) ............................ 14, 28 
Wilder, categorization, Belief, 
Similarly and Intergroup 
Discrimination, 32 J. Per. & 
Soc. Psych. 971 (1975) •.....••.••. 14 
Wolman & Frank, The Solo Woman 
in a Professional Peer Group, 
45 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 164 
(1975) ............................ 16 
- xv -
I I 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1 
Amici curiae are non-profit women's 
legal, education and research organiza-
tions, women's political and membership 
organizations, women I s bar associations, 
women's professional organizations and 
and other public interest groups 
individuals concerned about women's legal 
rights and women's economic status and 
well-being. The interest of each 
individual amicus curiae is set forth in 
the Appendix to this brief. 
Amici believe that the opinion below 
sets important precedent for the enforce-
ment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §2000e et seg., and that 
1 The parties have consented to the 
filing of this brief, and the letters of 
consent are being filed with the Clerk of 
the Court pursuant to Rule 36.2 of the 
Rules of this Court. 
- 1 -
this Court should affirm 
that decision to 
give important and needed
 guidance to the 
Circuits. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As United states Ambass
ador to the 
United Nations Je
ane Kirkpatrick, 
reflecting upon others' p
erceptions of her 
as a woman in a high gover
nment office, has 
said, "I've come to see he
re a double-bind: 
if a woman seems strong
, she is called 
'tough, ' and if she does
n I t seem strong, 
she's found not strong en
ough to occupy a 
high level job in a 
crunch." These 
evaluations, she noted, "
express a certain 
... general surprise and d
isapproval at the 
presence of a woman in ar
enas in which it 
is necessary to be - wha






summarize the experience 
of many women who 
- 2 -
have entered male-dominated occupations and 
have sought advancement. Her observations 
are borne out also by the conclusions 
reported in a vast body of scientific 
research on sex-based stereotyping, 
particularly in organizational behavior. 2 
The problem encapsulated by Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick in her speech is at the core of 
this case; strong, talented women like Ann 
Hopkins, seeking promotion in traditionally 
male realms of corporate and political 
power, all too often face evaluation by 
colleagues and superiors who perceive them 
as women first, as employees second. If 
2 The brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent addresses the breadth, depth and general scientific acceptability of this research upon which the expert testimony in this case is based. See also Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: stereotyping Per Se As A Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B. C. L. Rev. 345 (1980) (discussing relevance of sex stereotyping research to Title VII law). 
- 3 -
care is not taken to avoid st
ereotyping 
women in the process, wo
men are 
impermissibly and illegally asse
ssed using 
completely different standards 
and sexist 
norms. 
In this case the record is re
plete 
with evidence that the decis
ion-making 
process applied by Price Waterho
use to Ann 
Hopkins' bid for partnership wa
s pervaded 
by easily identifiable sex stereo
typing, to 
her detriment. There is no indic
ation that 
Price Waterhouse, a virtually 
all-male 
domain, took any steps to stop t
he obvious 
sexism in the evaluation proces
s. Such 
evidence is direct evide
nce of 




plaintiff to at least declara
tory and 
injunctive relief. No more nee
d be shown 
for the burden to shift to the de
fendant so 
that the defendant may attempt to
 show that 
- 4 -
other types of requested relief are 
inappropriate. At this stage the 
defendant, as a proven wrongdoer, should 
bear the burden of proving, if indeed it 
can, by clear and convincing evidence that 
make whole relief is inappropriate. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case typifies the "second generation" 
of employment discrimination cases. 
Although women are entering business and 
the professions, they are prevented from 
achieving the highest levels in those 
professions because of gender-based biases. 
In this case, Ann Hopkins was denied 
advancement to partnership status at Price 
Waterhouse even though she was personally 
responsible for bringing to the firm more 
new clients than anyone else in her 
candidate class and generating an estimated 
$34 to $44 million dollars in business. 
- 5 -
She was highly recommended by her clients. 
Her remarkable business achievements, which 
were alone sufficient to qualify her to 
join the ranks of the more than 650 
partners, 
instead 
were . virtually ignored, and 
the firm's all-male partnership 
committee focused almost exclusively on her 
personality, and in particular, on her 
"unladylike" characteristics: her hard-
driving, 
behavior. 
aggressive, and "unfeminine" 
Behavior that would have been 
expected, acceptable and perhaps even 
required of a man in a leadership position 
became a liability for this woman who was 
told she needed "a course in charm school" 
to qualify for partnership. 
That Ann Hopkins' sex was a critical 
factor in the failure of her partnership 
bid at Price Waterhouse is indisputable. 
She was evaluated in terms of sex-based 
stereotypes which prescribe specific forms 
- 6 -
of behavior and appearance for women.3 
These stereotypes are similar to other 
impermissible sex-based assumptions and 
generalizations, e.g., that women are not 
good at math, that they do not like or want 
factory work, or that they are or should be 




an employer's reliance on sex-
assumptions about appropriate 
or other characteristics 
constitutes direct evidence of intentional 
discrimination. Here the requirement that 
women conform to an idealized model of 
femininity was patently not job-related, 
3 These stereotypes rest on assump-
tions or generalizations that women should 
conform to certain "female" personality 
characteristics, but many women do not 
conform to II even a true generalization. 11 
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 
(1978). Stereotypes apply to expected 
behavior as well as other traits. 
- 7 -
since by virtually any measure, Hopkins' 
job performance was stellar. 
Moreover, as this case demonstrates, 
generalizations about how women should look 
and act create a profound dilemma for women 
aspiring to high-level positions. Those 
who fail . to conform, like Ann Hopkins, are 
criticized 
sufficiently 
because they are not 
"ladylike"; those who do 
conform to a female stereotype are deemed 
inadequate in job-related skills, because 
they are said not to be qualified to do a 
"man's" job. 4 Women seeking high-powered 
professional leadership positions thus walk 
4 See generally The Trapped Woman: 
Catch-22 in Deviance and Control 206-08 (J. 
Figueira-McDonough & R. Sarri eds. 1987) ; 
C. Tavris & c. Wade, The Longest War: Sex 
Differences in Perspective 265 (2d ed. 
1984); E. Schur, Labeling Women Deviant: 
Gender. Stigma. and Social Control (1983); 
V. Nieva & B. Gutek, Women & Work 59 
(1982); Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: 
The Lack of Fit Model in 5 Research in 
Organizational Behavior 269 (B. Staw & 
L. Cummings eds. 1983); 
- 8 -
a tightrope, so long as sex-stereotyped 
personality characteristics control access 
to such jobs. The significance of this 
phenomenon has been widely noted, as women 
have moved into lower level professional 
jobs in significant numbers, but have 
failed to progress to the upper echelon, in 
substantial part because of these invisible 
barriers. 5 
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, United 
states Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, described the problem in 
another way: 
[I] f I make a speech, particu-
larly a substantial speech, it 
has been frequently described in 
the media as "lecturing my 
colleagues, 11 as though it were 
somehow peculiarly inappropriate, 
5 As one study noted, the most 
insurmountable barrier is the way women are 
perceived by their male colleagues and 
evaluators. A. Morrison, R. White & E. Van 
Velsor, Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Can 
Women Reach the Top of America's Largest 
Corporations? (1987). 
- 9 -
like an ill-tempered schoolmarm 
might scold her children. When I 
have replied to criticisms of the 
United states (which is an 
important part of my job), I have 
frequently been described as 
"confrontational" .... It was a 
while before I noticed that none 
of my male colleagues, who often 
delivered more "confrontational" 
speeches than I, were labeled as 
"confrontational" .••. 
I've come to see here a double-
bind: if a woman seems strong, 
she is called "tough," and if she 
doesn't seem strong, she's found 
not strong enough to occupy a 
high level job in a crunch. 
Terms like "tough" and "confront-
ational" express a certain very 
general surprise and disapproval 
at the presence of a woman in 
arenas in which it is necessary 
to be - what for males would be 
considered - normally assertive. 
Stereotyping has endless vari-
ations. 
5 News for Women in Psychiatry 14, 14-15 
(Oct. 1986) (reprinting speech of 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick to the Women's 
Forum, New York City, December 19, 1984) 
(emphasis in original). 
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Ambassador Kirkpatrick's experiences 
are similar to Ann Hopkins', in that for 
both the perceptions and evaluations of 
their conduct were fundamentally altered 
because of their sex. In Hopkins's case, 
the result was the denial of partnership. 
At trial, Hopkins showed that the 
decision not to promote her, the sole 
woman, best client recruiter and highest 
money earner in a class of 88 candidates, 
resulted from an unfavorable evaluation 
directly related to the fact of her sex. 
The process by which this flawed evaluation 
was made is well-recognized and described 
by a large body of scientific research 




prominence in non-traditional professional 
jobs. Indeed, in this case, an expert 
cognitive psychologist, Dr. Susan Tufts 





This scientific research exposes the 
mechanisms by which invidious sexual, 
racial and other stereotypes operate in 
evaluation processes. Thus, in his classic 
volume, The Nature of Prejudice, Gordon 
Allport observed that "people use a 'least 
effort' principle of organization and group 
apparently similar people into 
t . 116 ca egories ..•. At the simplest level the 
research observes that perceivers use 
discriminating cues, especially physical 
traits such as sex and race, as ways of 
categorizing people and organizing 
6 Taylor, A Categorization Approach 
to Stereotyping, in Cognitive Processes in 
Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior 83, 83 
(D.L. Hamilton ed. 1980) (citing G. 
Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954), 
and Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution 
Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive 
Analysis of Prejudice, 5 Pers. & Soc. 
Psych. Bull. 461 (1979)). 
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information about them. As a result, 
because "similarity" is the organizing 
principle, within-group differences become 
minimized, and between-group differences 
become exaggerated. For example, women are 
seen as more similar to each other and more 
different from men. 7 
Once people are categorized into such 
groups, the potential for discrimination 
arises. Research on ingroup/outgroup 
effects "consistently demonstrates" when 
subjects are asked to evaluate their own 
group and the other group and allocate 
rewards between the groups, "out group 
7 See s. Fiske & s. Taylor, Social 
Cognition 160-61 (1984); Taylor, supra n. 
6, at 84-85. The within/between effect in 
cognitive process is documented in, among 
other sources, Taj f el, Sheikh & Gardner, 
Content of Stereotypes and the Inference of 
Similarity Between Members of Stereotyped 
Groups, 22 Acta Psychologica 191 ( 1964) ; 
Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as a 




ted less favorably 
and 
given fewer reward
s than in group 
mem-
bers ... even when th
e subject or subje
ct's 
group do not bene
fit from depriving 
or 
unfavorably evaluati
ng the out group.
118 
An example of this p
henomenon has been 
documented in "resu
me studies", in w
hich 
evaluators were g
iven resumes of 
job 
"applicants" that w
ere identical in ev
ery 
respect except the 
sex of the individ
ual 
named on the resum
e; female resumes 
were 
8 Taylor, supra n. 6, 
at 84 (citing 
















ination, 32 J. Pe
r. & 
Soc. Psych. 971 (1





group Behavior, 10 









an J. Soc. Psych.
 27 
(1973); Tajfel, Bi










consistently rated lower than the sex-
neutral or male resumes. 9 
In other words, even where all things 
are equal, evaluators tend to discount the 
accomplishments of women precisely because 
the accomplishments are those of women. 
The stable expectation, in the workplace, 
is that men succeed because of skill and 
fail because of bad luck or lack of effort 
and that women succeed because of luck or 
effort and fail because of lack of 
9 See generally Hitt & Zikmund, 
Forewarned is Forearmed: Potential Between 
and Within Sex Discrimination, 12 Sex Roles 
807 (1985); Rosen, Career Progress of 
Women: Getting In and Staying In, in Women 
in the Workforce 70 (H. Bernardin ed. 
1982); Heilman, supra n.4, at 281-82; Rosen 
& Jerdee, Influence of Sex Role Stereotypes 
on Personnel Decisions, 59 J. App. Psych. 9 
(1974). The resume studies have been 
replicated under field and laboratory 
conditions with subjects of all ages and 
levels of accomplishment. 
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ability.lo That is, men are 
credited for 
success and women are blamed
 for failure; 
men are assumed to be capa
ble and women 
must prove themselves repeate
dly. 11 
10 See K. Deaux, The Beh
avior of 
Women and Men ( 19 7 6) ; Hans
en & o' Leary, 
Actresses and Actors: The Ef
fect of Sex on 
causal Attributions, 4 Basi
c and Applied 
Soc. Psych. 209 (1984); D
eaux, Sex: A 
Perspective on the Attributio
n Process, in 
New Directions in Attribution
 Research (J. 
Harvey, W. Ickes & K. Kidel e
ds. 1976). 
11 The tendency to stereotyp
e is 
increased where the targ
et of the 
stereotyping is a token, i
.e. comprises 
fifteen to twenty-five perce
nt or less of 
the relevant group, and ev
aluations are 
more extreme in such circums
tances. See R. 
Kanter, Men and Women of th
e Corporation 
206-42 (1977); Crocker & Mc
Graw, What's 
Good for the Goose is Not 
Good for the 
Gander, 27 Am. Behav. Scienti
st 357 (1984); 
Heilman, The Impact of Situa
tional Factors 
on Personnel Decisions Con
cerning Women: 
Varying the Sex Composi
tion of the 
Applicant Pool, 26 org. Be
hav. and Hum. 
Perf. 386 (1980); Taylor, sup
ra n.6, at 89-
98; Spangler, Gordon & Pipken
, Token Women: 
An Empirical Test of the Kant
er Hypothesis, 
84 Am. J. Soc. 160 (1978) ; W
olman & Frank, 
The Solo Woman in a Prof
essional Pee1 




The implications of these research 
results are that impermissible sex-based 
factors are likely to block the attempts of 
women like Ann Hopkins to advance in 
careers from which women have previously 
been excluded. 
attributable to 
The effect is not just 
categorization 
ingroup/ outgroup dynamics, however. 
and 
Sex-
based categories are heavily laden with 
extensive social meanings and that baggage 
becomes applied when an individual is 
categorized based upon sex.12 Despite the 
apparent fluidity of sex role definitions 
in contemporary society, the social science 
research demonstrates a notable consistency 
in the different traits, characteristics 
and behaviors considered appropriate and 
desirable in men and women. 
12 See Fiske & Taylor, supra n. 7, at 139-189; Taylor, supra n. 6. 
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Studies show that overall, women are 
expected to be passive, nurturing, a
nd 
emotive and not to be aggres
sive, 
egotistical and competitive. Men, on t
he 
other hand, are expected to possess what 
is 
referred to as the "competency cluster 
of 













there is a degree of acceptance of women 
as 
competent, strong and professional, b
ut 
only so long as they continue to displ
ay 
the traits of the stereotypically fem
ale 
13 Ruble, Sex Stereotypes: Issues of 
Change in the 1970s, 9 Sex Roles 3
97 
(1982); Braverman, Vogel, Braverma
n, 
Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, Sex Role 
Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal, 28 J. 
of 
Soc. Issues 59 (1972). 
- 18 -
"warmth-expressiveness cluster" . 14 The 
research also shows that when women violate 
traditional sex role expectations, others 
tend to react negatively. Feelings of 
disappointment, irritation and anger are 
common responses to those who do not 
conform. 15 Interestingly, men have a wider 
latitude of acceptable traits and behaviors 
than do women16 , particularly in the work-
place. The men who have risen to the top 
of corporate America are described by those 
who work under them and by the media, as 
1 4 Braverman, supra n.13; A. Morrison 
et al., supra, n.5, at 54-56. 
15 N. Henley, =B=o=da.oY--P--=o:..::l:..:1=-· t=i=c=s 197 
(1977); V. Nieva & B. Gutek, supra n.4, at 
76. 
16 E. Schur, supra n.4, at 134. 
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Some of these points were brough
t out 
in Dr. Fiske's testimony. 
But this 
knowledge is not the province
 only of 
social scientists. People who
 care about 
the problems of inequality or th
e loss of 
human capital when managerial dec
isions are 
based upon sex (or race) rather t
han actual 
17 "A Humble Hero Drives Ford To Th
e 
Top," Fortune, January 4, 198
8 at 23, 
describing the Chairman of the 
Ford Motor 
Company. 
18 "How Tom Mitchell Lays Out Th
e 
Competition," Fortune, March 30
, 1987 at 
91, describing the President o
f Seadate 
Technology. In an article descr
ibing some 
of the country's most promi
nent male 
executives, such as General 
Electric's 
Chairman, Simon & Schuster's Presid
ent and 
Gulf & Western' s Chief Executiv
e Officer, 
Fortune Magazine wrote, " [ i J f you 
want to 
know how tough they can be, ask 
the people 
who work for them - the subord
inates who 
have to put up with ego-shreddi
ng, criti-
cism, insatiable demands, and 
Wagnerian 
fits of anger. 11 "The Toughest 
Bosses in 
America," Fortune, August 6, 1984
 at 18. 
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ability or performance are instinctively 
aware of the dynamics of sex stereotyping. 
Moreover, sex stereotyping is preventable; 
it is possible to perceive ahd judge 
others, even tokens, based upon their 
individual characteristics and behavior 
rather than through the prism of their sex. 
Caring, taking time and paying attention to 
tangible performance requirements and 
actual performance, not generalized, 
ambiguous characteristics such as those 
used by Price Waterhouse, helps. Being 
aware of one's own thought-processes and 
staying alert for evidence of sex stereo-
typed thinking the tell-tale words, 
phrases and concepts prevalent in Price 
Waterhouse's partners' 
Hopkins' candidacy 





 Finally, as 
the proportion that a
ny minority represen
ts 





I. The Record is R






Ann Hopkins was an e
xceptionally well-
qualified partnership






 had generated mo
re 
business for Price 
Waterhouse than plai
n-
tiff." Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse, 8
25 
F.2d 458, 462 (D.C
. Cir. 1987) (citin
g 
Hopkins, 618 F. Su
pp 1109, 1112 (D.D
.C. 
19 see generally s. Fiske &
 S. Tay-
lor, supra n.7, at 1
39-81; Fiske & Neuberg
, 















Zanna ed. 1988); H
eilman, supra n.4, 
at 
289-92; Ruble, Cohen
 & Ruble, Sex Stereo-
types: Occupational 
Barriers for Women, 
27 
Am. Behav. Scientist
 339 (1984). 
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1985)). "She billed more hours than any of 
the other candidates under consideration." 
Id. The clients whom she served liked her 
work. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 
F. supp. 1109, 1112 (O.o.c. 1985). 
Yet, the comments by the evaluating 
partne~s show that their focus was on her 
gender, not her business acumen. Her 
critics and supporters alike couched their 
evaluations of her in gender specific 
terms. It 
compensated 
was said that "she 
for being a woman," 




masculine mgr. [manager) to [a) 
much more appealing lady partner candi-
date." Id. at 1116-1117. one partner 
described her as "macho." Id. at 1117. 
It is clear from the record that 
Hopkins' perceived deficiencies lay in her 
failure to conform to sex-based behavioral 
stereotypes. Ann Hopkins was evaluated as 
- 23 -






 to female 
She was a "toug
h-talking," 
"formidable" wom






ained, "it's a l
ady using 
foul language. 
11 Id. She was e
xplicitly 




to why her pa
rtnership 
consideration wa
s deferred and 
how she 
might do better
, 20 to "walk m
ore fem-
20 That many of th
e obviously sex 
stereotyped comm
ents about Ann 
Hopkins 
quoted in the Di
strict Court's op
inion were 




 not mean that 
Hopkins' 


















her and that s
he was being h
eld to a 
different standa












ere aware that M
s. Hopkins 
was judged acco
































ininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. Therefore, she was evaluated according to standards applicable only to female candidates. 
such evidence is more than sufficient to establish a case of intentional discri-mination based largely on direct evidence, not on inferences. The discriminatory process to which Hopkins was subjected was not an isolated event. In fact, the sex-based comments made about her were "part of the regular fodder of partnership evalua-tions." Id. Female candidates for partner-ship had previously been denigrated for 
standards and that they advised her to 
comply with those standards does not, 
erase the discrimination upon sex, as Judge 
Williams, dissenting from the court of 
appeals decision, erroneously concluded; it 
compounds it. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 







. One partner c
ategorical-





 that women 




s. " Id. D
iscriminatory 
intent is also 
evident from th
e history of 
sex-segregation 
in the job,
21 and the use 







sly retained by 
the company 
despite evidence
 that it was tai
nted by sex 
stereotypes. Id
.22 
21 The fact tha




es and was 
being evaluated
 for partners
hip by an 
organization ha
ving 662 male 
and partners 


















 or panels d
ominated by 
members of a di
fferent sex ... 
such proce-




























Finally, the testimony of Dr. Fiske 
established discrimination. Dr. Fiske 
examined the record created in connection 
with Price Waterhouse's partnership 
decision-making. She found all of the 
antecedent conditions that, according to 
the research, strongly indicate that 
stereotyping is likely to take place--
rarity of the target, selectivity of 
perception and memory by the target's 
evaluators, extremely negative reactions 
and broad overgeneralizations by her 
detractors, to name only a few factors. 
She also found the factor most obvious to 
the lay observer - the extensive discus-
sions referring to Hopkins' sex. Finally 
she found no factors indicating that the 
of their capacity for masking unlawful bias." Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (quoting Davis v. Califano 613 F. 2d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). See also, Coble v. Hot Springs School District No. 6, 682 F. 2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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influences of stereotypes would be avoided 
in the ultimate outcome. Based upon these 
indicators, she concluded that sex stereo-
typing was important in Price Waterhouse's 
decision about Ann Hopkins' candidacy. See 
Fiske Testimony. The court accepted this 
testimony. 23 Thus the promotion process 
23 Dr. Fiske is an extremely well-
qualified researcher in the field of social 
cognition including sex stereotyping, 
trained as well in the research on organi-
zational behavior, the author of numerous 
articles and a leading text on the subject 
of social cognition. The methodology 
applied by Dr. Fiske in reaching that 
conclusion in this case, grounded as it is 
in extensive research and drawing from the 
evidence created in the ordinary course of 
the subject's daily events without further 
intrusion by the researcher, is an accepted 
and respected mode of research in its own 
right. See E. Webb, D. Campbell, R. 
Schwartz & L. Sechrest, Unobtrusive 
Measures: Nonreactive Research in the 
Social Sciences ( 1966) . The research on 
stereotypes confirms that where stereo-
typing is evidenced the stereotyped 
category, i.e. the sex or race of the 
target is the causal factor. s. Fiske & s. 
Taylor, supra n.7, at 138-89. See H. 
Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimen-
tal Research ( 1964) ( explaining causal 
analysis in research). 
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ided itself was II impermiss ibly infected by 
hese sexual stereotypes." Hopkins v. Price 



























such a process in and of itself 
violates Title VII. 2 4 To end employers' 
24 Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985). In Bibbs, one of the key players in the promotion process was known to utter racial slurs. The court held that "[f]orcing Bibbs to be considered for promotion in a process in which race plays a discernible part is itself a violation of the law, regardless of the outcome of the process. 11 Bibbs, 778 F. 2d at 1322. See also Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935-37 (1st Cir. 1987) (tenure decision found to be impermissibly tainted by "pervasively sexist attitudes"); Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir.), aff'd after remand, 804 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1984) (court held that employer's state-ments about plaintiff's femininity were evidence that she was held to a different, sex-linked standard and required an initial finding of Title VII liability); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984) (employer's reference to plaintiff's femininity was found to evince a sex stereotyped view of her physical abilities and was "the kind of invidious discrimina-tion that violates Title VII"); EEOC v. FLC 
- 29 -
reliance on outmoded sex stereotypes of the 
sort present in this case was a primary 
congressional purpose in enacting Title 
VII: 
Women are subject to economic depriva-
tion as a class . . . Numerous studies 
have shown that women are placed in 
the less challenging, the less respon-
and Brothers Rebel, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 864 
(W.D. Va. 1987) (court found discriminatory 
animus in employer's statement that he 
fired woman bartender for her use of 
"unladylike language") 
In a related context, this Court has 
held that plaintiff may establish a 
violation of Title VII by proving that sex 
discrimination created a hostile or abusive 
work environment. See Meritor savings 
· Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
See also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 
944 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (sexually stereotyped 
insults and demeaning propositions that 
poison one's working environment violate 
Title VII). The very maintenance of a 
hostile work environment may lead to the 
conclusion that promotion decisions made in 
that context were discriminatory. See, 
~, Broderick v. Ruder, No. 86-1834, slip 
op. (D.D.C. May 13, 1988) (that SEC 
superiors permitted sexually harassing 
working conditions to be created and 
refused to remedy environment compels 
conclusion that plaintiff lost promotion 
and job opportunities because of the 
hostile climate). 
- 30 -
.e sible and the less remunerative 
positions on the basis of their sex 
y alone.... The time has come to bring 
an end to job discrimination once and 
e for all, and to insure every citizen 
the opportunity for the decent self-
respect that accompanies a iob 
commensurate with one's abilities. 25 






Department of Water and Power v. Manhart: 
Even a true generalization about 
the class is an insufficient 
reason for disqualifying an 
individual to whom the generali-
zation does not apply .... [T]he 
statute requires that we focus on 
fairness to individuals rather 
than fairness to classes. 
Practices that classify employees 
in terms of religion, race, or 
sex tend to preserve traditional 
assumptions about groups rather 
than thoughtful scrutiny of 
individuals. 
435 U.S. at 708-09. See also Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. s. 542, 545 
(1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Title 
25 H.R. Rep. No. 889, 92d Cong. 2d 
Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 2140, 2141 (1972) 
(Legislative History of the Equal Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972). 
- 31 -
VII does not permit "ancient canards" abo
ut 
women to be a basis for discrimination).
26 
Thus, this Court has refused to allo
w 







refused to permit 
2 6 This Court has in the equal 
protection context recognized the discr
i-
mination inherent in the "baggage of sexu
al 
stereotypes" which is used to classif
y, 
limit, protect or otherwise needless
ly 
differentiate between men and women, to t
he 
historical disadvantage of women as 
a 
class. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 2
83 
(1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S
. 
677, 684-85 ( 1973) . In Roberts v. Unit
ed 
states Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984
), 
this Court noted: 
(D]iscrimination based on archaic and 
overbroad assumptions about the 
relative needs and capacities of the 
sexes forces individuals to labor 
under stereotypical notions that often 
bear no relationship to their actual 
abilities. It thereby both deprives 
persons of their individual dignity 
and denies society of the benefits of 
wide participation in political, 
economic, and cultural life. 
See also Mississippi Univ. for Women 
v. 



























negative assumptions about women's ability 
to combine paid work with parental respon-
sibilities to affect employment decisions 
(Phillips). Consistent with this prece-
dent, there is no basis to permit Price 
Waterhouse to make promotion decisions in 
express reliance on stereotypical notions 
about "ladylike" behavior, especially when 
such behavior is palpably unrelated to job 
performance. 27 
The courts below designated this a 
"mixed" or "dual motive case" - one in 
27 Whether Hopkins' personality 
characteristics could be job-related is not 
presented by this case, since she clearly 
was more than capable of performing the 
significant elements of her job. Nor can 
the associational interests of the partners 
create a legitimate reason to deny her 
advancement, given that Price Waterhouse, a 
business with over 650 partners, is not an 
exclusive group. See Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 59 (1984). Some of 
Price Waterhouse's arguments seem to be 
based on a need to satisfy "customer 
preference", but in fact Hopkins' customers 





which the defendant 
is motivated by both
 
illegal and legal co
nsiderations. To the 
contrary, the proof w
as that defendant was
 
motivated by only
 one consideration, 
plaintiff's gender. 
As discussed above, 
plaintiff's personal
ity and personality-
related conduct were 
perceived as inappro-
priate because of h
er gender. Neither 
defendant nor plainti
ff nor the court could
 














actions to Ms. Ho
pkins' personality.28
 
28 In a true "dual m




to some degree, sepa
rate. For instance, 
one could imagine a 
mixed motive case in
 
which the court accep
ts proof of discrimi-
· 
natory bias and the d
efendant asserts that
 
its decision was base
d instead on the fact
 
that the plaintiff em
bezzled funds in the 
job. In such a cas
e, the fact that the
 
plaintiff committed 
a felony is distinct
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h Moreover, it is virtually impossible fairly 
e to examine Hopkins' conduct without taking 
s into account the discriminatory conditions 
under which Ms. Hopkins had to perform her 
job, knowing that her evaluators were using 
her sex as the basis of their perceptions 
of and assumptions about her. 29 
Indeed, if anything, this case is more 
akin to "sex-plus" cases. In the first 
"sex-plus" case, Martin Marietta attempted 
to exonerate its refusal to hire women, but 
not men, who had preschool aged children by 
claiming that the burden of women's family 
responsibilities were its operative 
motivation. Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
from the proven discriminatory bias. As a factor in job suitedness, it is capable of separate evaluation in a way that an allegation about an individual's personal-ity is not. 
29 See Hamilton, et al., The Emotional Consequences of Gender-Based Abuse in the Workplace, 6 Women and Therapy 155 (1987); Taub, supra n.2, at 357-360. 
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Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (197
1). This Court 
rejected that argument. 
Price Waterhouse 
similarly attempts to exon
erate its refusal 
to promote Hopkins on the
 alleged grounds 
of her "poor interpersona
l skills," where 
men I s interpersonal skill
s did not block 
their advancement. 
availing. 
This is no more 
Assumptions based on the 
sex of the 
individual constitute int
entional discri-
mination in its classic fo
rm. This is true 
regardless of the precis
e nature of the 
sex-based assumptions, w
hich have taken 
many forms as the cases de
monstrate. Title 
VII forbids employment de
cisions that are 
so tainted. 
II. The Direct Evidence o
f Sex Discrimina-
tion Here Establishes 
Liability Under 
Title VII and Requires 
That the Burden 
Shift to Defendant To Sho
w That No Relief 
Should Be Granted. 
Title VII is violated once
 race or sex 
is shown to beg factor i









decision. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
335 n. 15 (1977). This was made clear when 
the statute was originally proposed: "What 
this bill does ... is simply to make it an 
illegal practice to use race as a factor in 
denying employment. u30 This showing is 
sufficient to award plaintiff relief unless 
1e the defendant proves that relief would 
l- clearly be inappropriate. 
1e As demonstrated above, the record was 
1e replete with evidence that Price Waterhouse 
m relied on sex-specific behavioral require-
Le ments and sex-stereotypical notions of 
~e personality characteristics. This evidence 
alone is sufficient to establish liability 
tX 
under Title VII. Whether Hopkins was 
entitled to a partnership, or whether there 
30 Remarks 
Cong. Rec. 13,088 
by Senator case, 
13,838 (1964). 
by Senator Humphrey, 110 
(1964). See also remarks 
110 Cong. Rec. 13,837-
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 its denial can
 be justi-
fied, is anothe
r question - on
e of remedy-
as to which the
 defendant bear
s the burden 
of proof. 
A. With Direct 
Discrimination 




a Title VII Vi
olation 
the Burden of 
Proof 
This Court has






e employer to 
that of a 
proved wrongdoe
r." Teamsters, 
431 U.S. at 
360 n.45. This
 occurs without
 any inquiry 
into the quali






which is solely 
















 a question 
not relating to
 liability but 
to relief. 










conduct. 32 Once discrimination has been 
found, an individual plaintiff or class 
member enjoys "a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of individual relief," Teamsters, 431 
U.S. at 359 n.45, and the burden shifts to 
the "employer to demonstrate that the 
individual applicant was denied an employ-
ment opportunity for lawful reasons." Id. 
at 362. 33 
The shift of the burden of persuasion 
32 Bifurcated proceedings as to liability and remedy are often held in Title VII cases. 
33 This burden cannot be satisfied simply by asserting that the best qualified candidates had been hired. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 344 n.24. Likewise, in constitu-tional cases this Court has found "simple protestations" that discrimination did not affect the result "insufficient." Cas-taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 498 n.19 (1977). Accord Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972). See point IIc infra. 
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is appropriate: 34 proof of discriminatory 
motive radically alters the position of the 
Title VII defendant to that of a "proved 
wrongdoer." By separating the issue of 
liability from that of relief, as this 
Court has traditionally done in Title VII 
cases, it becomes possible to adjust the 
burden on the defendant in accord with its 
changed status. Proof of bias creates 
liability and a presumption in favor of 
relief. It does not automatically compel a 
specific remedy in an individual instance, 
34 Similarly, this Court has approved 
separating the question of liability from 
that of remedy in individual cases under 
Title VI and the equal protection clause, 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (Powell, J., for 
the Court) (whether Bakke would have been 
admitted goes to the issue of relief, not 
liability), and under the due process 
clause, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 
(1978) (the right to due process is 
"absolute" and "does not depend upon the 









but the employer does and should bear a 
heavy burden to prove that the applicant or 
employee who was subjected to a discrimina-
tory practice did not actually suffer as a 
result. 35 
Similarly the difficulty of separating 
illegal from legal motives is a burden 
which the defendant, as wrongdoer, should 
properly bear. As this Court has explain-
ed: 
The employer is a wrongdoer, he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was not created by innocent activity but by his own wrong-doing. 
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 
462 U.S. at 403 (1983) (construing National 
35 Especially in this situation, there is 11 (n] o reason . . . why the victim rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act should bear the burden of proof on this issue. 11 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co. , 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976). 
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Labor Relations Act). 
See also League of 
United Latin American C
itizens v. City of 
Salinas Fire Dep't, 654
 F.2d 557, 559 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (Title VII); 
King v. Trans World 
Airlines, 738 F.2d 255, 
257 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(Title VII). 
Requiring plaintiff to p
rove more than 
the presence of disc
rimination in the 
employment process to 
establish liability 
would undermine the pur
poses of Title VII. 
As Justice Scalia noted
 in Toney v. Block, 
705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C
. Cir. 1983): "[I]t 
is unreasonable and d
estructive of the 
purposes of Title VI
I to require the 
plaintiff to establish
 in addition the 
difficult hypothetical 
proposition that, 
had there been no d
iscrimination, the 
employment decision wou
ld have been made in 
his favor." 
In fact, Congress 
specifically 
rejected an amendment 












imposed this impossibly heavy burden on 
plaintiff. 36 110 Cong. Rec. 13,838 (1964). 
In analogous contexts, this Court has 
approved shifting the burden to the 
employer to show that the same decision 
would have been reached absent discrimina-
tion "when there is a proof that a dis-
criminatory purpose has been a motivating 
factor in the decision .... " Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). 
36 Congress rejected an amendment that would have required a plaintiff to show that a prohibited basis was "solely" the basis for an adverse employment decision. 110 Cong. Rec. 13, 837 (1964) (Amendment proposed by Senator McClellan; Senator Case explaining that proposed amendment would render Title VII "nuga-tory"). 
While the Court has occasionally described Title VII proof in terms of a "but for" test,~, McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 ( 19 7 6) , this language has to be read in light of the fact that congress explicitly rejected the proposed amendment. 
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In such a case, "judicia
l deference is no 
longer justified." Id. 
Some decisions appear 
to require a 
showing that an unlaw
ful motive was a 
"substantial" factor in
 the challenged 
decision before shifting
 the burden to the 
defendant to prove that t
he "same decision" 
would have been reached
 anyway. 3 7 These 
are constitutional cas
es in which the 
burden on the plainti
ff is concededly 
greater than in the Ti
tle VII context3
8 . 
Even in constitutional ch
allenges, however, 
this approach has not 
been consistently 
followed, 39 and it is 
inappropriate, in 
37 See, ~, Hunter v
. Underwood, 
471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985
) (equal protect-
ion); Mt. Healthy Schoo
l Dist. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274 (1977) (firs
t amendment). 
38 Cf. Washington v. Dav
is, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976); Personnel A
dm'r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (197
9) 
39 Compare, ~, Carey v
. Piphus, 
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is unlawful, befor
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t either is a facto
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that has influence
d choice or it is 
not." 
Personnel Adm'r of
 Mass. v. Feeney, 
447 
U. s. 256, 277 ( 1979) (



















and of itself, c
onstitutes a cogn
izable 
injury for which 
liability attaches
. See 




 presumption in fa
vor of 
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make whole relief arises, defendant may 
nonetheless prove that the discrimination 
did not cause the specific injury com-
plained of, and that the specific make 
whole relief requested is not warranted. 
This formulation derives directly from 
authoritative Title VII caselaw and is 
consistent with caselaw in analogous areas 
involving discrimination; it provides a 
clear, uniform, familiar, and workable 
analysis for "mixed motive" situations; and 
it would provide the same degree of 
statutory protection to plaintiffs in this 
category of cases as has traditionally been 
enjoyed by other Title VII plaintiffs. 
B. The Burden-shifting Formulation of 
Burdine and McDonnell Douglas is Inappro-
priate Here. 
The petitioner incorrectly asserts 
that the burden-shifting approach in cases 
- 46 -
such as Texas De
p't of Community A
ffairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S.
 248 (1981), and 
McDonnell 
Douglas Corp v. G






, in order to es
tablish a 
prima facie case









. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 
577 (1978), the p






ese acts, if 
otherwise 
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the Court said in
 Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 255 
n.8, that the "a
llocation 
of burdens and t
he creation of a
 presump-
tion by the estab












Proof of discriminatory motive is the end-
point contemplated by the Burdine analysis. 
In this case, Hopkins proved through direct 
evidence that Price Waterhouse considered 
her gender in evaluating her candidacy for 
promotion. Under Burdine and Furnco, she 
thus satisfied her ultimate burden, and the 
kind of defense those cases contemplate was 
no longer available. 
This Court has held squarely that the 
burden shifting formula set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas is "inapplicable where 
the plaintiff presents direct evidence of 
discrimination." Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 
"The shifting burdens of proof set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure 
that 'the plaintiff [has] his day in court 
despite the unavailability of direct 


























The Burdine formula was not meant to 
be a "Procrustean bed within which all 
disparate treatment cases must be forced to 
lie." Bell v. Birmingham Linen Services, 
717 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). See also 
United Postal Service Board of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 
U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (citations omitted) 
( "the prima facie case method established 
in McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to 
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic'")). 
The Courts of Appeals have uniformly 
recognized the inapplicability of the 
Burdine approach in cases presenting direct 
evidence of discrimination. For instance, 
in Bell v. Birmingham Linen Services., 715 
F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1204 (1984), the Eleventh Circuit 
noted: 
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If the evidence consists of direct 
testimony that the defendant acted 
with discriminatory motive, and the 
trier of fact accepts this testimony, 
the ultimate issue of discrimination 
is proved. Defendant cannot refute 
this evidence by mere articulation of 
other reasons; the legal standard 
changes dramatically. 
Id. at 1557. This approach has been widely 
endorsed. 40 
40 Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair 
Countv. Ky., 825 F. 2d 111, 114-5 (6th Cir. 
1987) ( "The McDonnell Douglas formula is 
inapplicable ... to cases in which the ... 
plaintiff presents credible, direct 
evidence of discriminatory animus."); 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 777 F.2d 113, 130 
(3rd Cir. 1985), aff'd, U.S. , 107 
s.ct. 2617 (1987) ("The presumptions and 
shifting burdens are merely an aid - not 
ends in themselves. When direct evidence 
is available, problems of proof are no 
different than in other civil cases."); 
Miles v. MNC Corp, 750 F.2d 867, 875 n. 9 
(11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Lee v. Russell 
County Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 
774 (11th Cir. 1982) (where the evidence 
consists, as it does here, of direct 
testimony that defendants acted with a 
discriminatory motivation, "if the trier of 
fact believes the prima facie evidence, the 
ultimate issue of discrimination is proved, 
no inference is required.")); Lewis v. 
Smith, 731 F.2d 1533, 1537-1538 (11th Cir. 
1984) (where discriminatory intent has been 































Price Waterhouse's characterization of 
this as a "mixed motive" case does not make 
the Burdine formula any more applicable. 41 
issue is proved); Muntin v. State of 
California Parks and Recreation Department, 
6 7 1 F . 2 d 3 6 0 , 3 6 3 ( 9th Cir . 19 8 2 ) , a ff ' d , 
738 F. 2d 1054 ( 1984) (where plaintiff 
proves discriminatory animus by direct 
evidence, "this . . . not only permits, but 
compels an inference ( of discrimination] . 
That being so, there is no need, for the 
purpose of deciding whether a Title VII 
violation has occurred, to consider the 
explanations which an employer might claim 
.... No such explanation could be suf-
ficient, as a matter of law, to justify a 
judgment that unlawful discrimination did 
not occur.") ; Loeb v. Textron, 600 F. 2d 
1003, 1014 ( 1st Cir. 1979) (Burdine 
approach is inapplicable where plaintiff 
relies on direct evidence of discrimina-
tion). 
41 That Burdine did not contemplate 
the so-called "mixed-motive" case is 
obvious. In Burdine, as this Court 
discussed in an analogous context, "the 
question was who had '[t]he ultimate burden 
of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated 
against plaintiff .... ' The Court discus-
sed only the situation in which the issue 
is whether either illegal or legal motives, 
but not both, were the •true' motives 
behind the decision." NLRB v. Transporta-
tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n. 
5 (1983) (citation omitted). See also, 
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As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Bell, it 
would be "illogical" and "ironic" if direct 
evidence of motive or conduct forbidden by 
Title VII could be negated by the mere 
articulation, not proof, that the employ-
ment decision was undertaken for permis-
sible reasons. 42 In almost every circuit, 
once plaintiff proves by direct evidence 
the presence of discrimination, the burden 
is placed on the defendant to prove that a 
remedy should not be requirea.43 
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
42 In addition, this allocation of 
the burden is in accord with the principle 
of placing upon a party the burden of 
proving facts peculiarly within its own 
knowledge. United States v. New York. N.H. 
& Hartford R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 
(1957). See also c. McCormick, Evidence, 
§337 (1984). 
43 Whether or not the inquiry is 
separated into liability and remedy phases, 
the burden shifts to defendant to prove 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
relief. See, ~, Fields v. Clark 
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C. Where the Plaintiff has Proved that 
the Employment Decision Was Tainted by 
Discrimination, The Purposes of Title 
VII Can Be Served Only by Requiring 
the Defendant to Meet a Clear and 
Convincing Evidentiary Standard. 
The twin goals of Title VII--
deterring illegal conduct by employers and 
affording employees make whole relief--
are aptly served by requiring a defendant, 
upon a showing by direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent, to show by clear and 
University, 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987); 
Haskins v. United States Dept of the Army, 
808 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 
s.ct 68 (1987). Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 
1318 (8th Cir. 1985); Smallwood v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Fadhl v. 
City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 
1552 ( 9th Cir. 1984) ; Bell v. Birmingham 
Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); 
Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d. 1083 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); But see McQuillen v. Wisconsin 
Education Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1068 
(1988), Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 
725 F.2d 910 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 892 (1984). 
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convincing evidence that the plaintiff 
would have suffered the challenged adverse 
employment action even absent discrimina-
tion. Title VII was "intended to strike at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment." City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water 
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 
13 (1978). See also McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 801: "Title 
VII tolerates no ... discrimination, subtle 
or otherwise." The primary thrust of Title 
VII is to "eradicat [ e] discrimination 
throughout the economy and [to make] 
persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). 
Title VII's protection is a narrow but 
stringent prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on certain immutable character-
istics ennumerated as prohibited bases in 














that of employment. Because it narrowly 
focuses solely on the employment context, 
in contrast to the broader sweep of the 
equal protection clause which reaches the 
full range of employment and nonemployment 
government action, this Court and Congress 
have recognized that it is appropriate to 
place more stringent requirements on the 
defendant employer under Title VII than 
under the equal protection clause. 44 Title 
VI I's remedial and deterrent purposes are 
best served by imposing a clear and 
44 Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976) (equal protection does not 
reach neutral action with discriminatory 
effect without a showing of intent) with 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971) (liability in Title VII may be 
imposed upon a showing of discriminatory 
impact; explicit discriminatory intent need 
not be proved); compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 
417 U.S. 484 (1974) (employment discrimina-
tion against pregnant women does not 
violate the equal protection clause) with 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) 
(amending Title VII to define pregnancy 
discrimination as sex discrimination). 
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convincing evidentiary standard on defend-
ants who have acted illegally. "By making 
it more difficult for employers to defeat 
successful plaintiffs' claims the 
higher standard of proof might well 
discourage unlawful conduct by employers." 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1373 (Tamm, J., 
concurring) . 
A preponderance of the evidence 
standard is appropriate only where the 
interests of the parties are balanced and 
it is just that they share equally the 
"risk of error." Herman and MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983). See 
also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 
(1979). However, where the interests weigh 
more heavily in favor of one party, the 
more stringent clear 
evidence standard must 
and 
be 


















The interest of an employee not to be 
harmed in his or her ability to make a 
livelihood because of his or her race, sex, 
national origin or religion is far superior 
to the interest of an employer to make 
employment decisions based upon such 
prohibited characteristics. See Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 59, 68-69 (1984). 
Once the defendant in a Title VII case has 
been proved to engage in discriminatory 
conduct, it is only fair and equitable that 
such a "proved" wrongdoer should bear the 
lion's share of the risk of error: "The 
higher standard of proof is justified by 
the consideration that the employer is a 
proved wrongdoer whose unlawful conduct has 
made it difficult for the plaintiff to show 
what would have occurred in the absence of 
that conduct." Toney v. Block, 705 F. 2d 
13 6 4 , 13 7 3 ( D . C . Cir . 19 8 3 ) ( Tamm , J • , 
concurring) . As noted by the D.C. Circuit 
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in Day v. Mathews, "[i]t is now impossible 
for an individual discriminatee to recreate 
the past with exactitude ... because of the 
employer's unlawful action; it is only 
equitable that any resulting uncertainty be 
resolved against the party whose action 
gave rise to the problem." 530 F.2d 1083, 
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). 
This standard is routinely applied to 
defendants in a number of circuits. The 
D.C. Circuit was the first to apply it in 
Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. 1976). 
In Day. the plaintiff proved discrimination 
by circumstantial evidence and sought 
retroactive relief. The defendant did not 
contest the finding of discrimination on 
appeal. The Court placed the burden on the 
employer to defeat plaintiff's claim for 
retroactive relief and required the 
employer to meet a clear and convincing 
































deterrent and make whole purposes of Title 
VII. Id. at 1086. 45 
The Ninth Circuit also applies this 
standard to employers at the remedy stage 
45 For a fuller explication of Day v. 
Mathews as interpreted by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, see 
Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 97-99 
(D.C. Cir. 1982). See also Bundy v. 
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(where discriminatory work environment is 
shown, burden shifts to employer to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that particu-
lar employment action was not the result of 
discrimination). But see Johnson v. Brock, 
810 F.2d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Day 
applies only after plaintiff has establish-
ed a statutory violation with respect to 
the particular position for which retro-
active relief is sought); Toney v. Block, 
705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(same). 
Here, plaintiff has shown by direct 
evidence that discrimination played a 
significant role in the decision not to 
promote her. See pp. 22-29 supra. Accord-
ingly, plaintiff's proof is considerably 
more substantial than that presented in 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). In Toney, the district court found 
that race was not a factor in the promotion 
decision at issue. Plaintiff showed only 
that race played a role in another employ-
ment context which plaintiff argued might 
have influenced the promotion decision. Id. 
at 1365. 
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of litigation. See, e.g., Muntin v. State 
of Cal. Parks and Recreation Dep't, 671 
F . 2 d 3 6 0 , 3 6 2 - 6 3 ( 9th Cir . 19 8 2 ) , a ff ' d , 
738 F. 2d 1054 ( 9th Cir. 1984) ; Marotta v. 
Usery, 629 F. 2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1980) . 
In the Ninth Circuit once plaintiff has 
established initial liability by proving by 
direct evidence that discrimination played 
a significant factor in the adverse 
employment decision, she is entitled to 
prospective relief. Retroactive relief is 
forthcoming unless the defendant shows by 
clear and convincing evidence that the same 
decision would have been reached absent the 
discrimination. The Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits have imposed a clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard on defendants who 
have an immediate or recent past history of 
discrimination. See, e.g., Gilchrest v. 
Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 
















Dist., 721 F.2d 976 (4th Cir. 1983). The 
Fourth Circuit has also established clear 
and convincing evidence as the appropriate 
standard where plaintiff proves discrimina-
tion by direct evidence. Patterson v. 
Greenwood School District 50, 696 F.2d 293 
(4th Cir. 1982). In Patterson, the 
plaintiff produced evidence of sex stereo-
typing in the decision not to promote her 
to principal. 696 F.2d at 294.46 As in 
the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, this burden is 
applied to defendant at the remedy stage of 
litigation, once liability for injunctive 
46 The district court based its 
finding of discrimination in part on the 
subjective and male dominated selection 
procedure and evidence that the committee 
was searching for a candidate who fit a 
male stereotype. Plaintiff was penalized 
in the process for her "nervousness," 
"high-pitched voice" and "over-domineering 
personality." Patterson, 696 F.2d at 294. 
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relief has been imposed. 47 See also Price 
v. Denison Independent School Dist. , 694 
F . 2 d 3 3 4 , 3 7 6 n . 7 8 ( 5th Cir. 19 8 2 ) ( a p-
p l i cation of clear and convincing evidence 
standard in Fifth Circuit).48 
47 Similarly, in class action 
discrimination cases, several circuits have 
held the employer as a proven wrongdoer to 
a clear and convincing evidence standard to 
.rebut a showing of entitlement to relief. 
See, ~, Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
co., 784 F.2d 1546,1561 (11th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, U.S. , 107 s. ct. 274 
(1986); McKenzre--v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 77 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); League of United Latin 
American citizens v. City of Salinas, 654 
F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir. 1981); Baxter v. 
Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 
437, 444 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1033 (1974). 
48 Only two circuits explicitly 
reject the clear and convincing evidence 
standard in Title VII cases involving 
direct evidence of discrimination. Fields 
v. Clark University. 817 F.2d 431, 437 (1st 
Cir. 1987); Craik v. Minnesota State 
University Board, 731 F.2d 465, 470 n.8 
( 8th Cir .1984) . The preponderance of the 
evidence standard has been applied else-
where, but with no discussion of the reason 
for its use instead of the clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard. 
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Finally, clear and convincing evidence 
is required of defendants in actions before 
the EEOC. See EEOC Remedial Actions, 29 
C. F. R. 1613. 271 ( 1980) . The guidelines, 
while not controlling upon the courts, "do 
constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants properly resort for guidance." 
Meritor Savings Bank. FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-
42 (1976)). 
Price Waterhouse was properly held to 
a clear and convincing evidentiary standard 
in this case. Plaintiff proved by direct 
evidence that discriminatory bias played a 
significant role in the decision not to 
promote her to the position for which 
retroactive relief was sought. Defendant's 
status was therefore elevated to proved 
wrongdoer. In order to avoid liability for 
- 63 -
make-whole relief, it was appropriately 
obligated to prove that it would have made 
the "same decision" absent bias by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
the deci~ion below and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with that judgment. 
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Statements of Interest of Amici Curiae 
The American Association of University 
Women ("AAUW") a national organization of 
over 150,000 college-educated women and 
men, is strongly committed to promoting and 
achieving legal, social, educational and 
economic equity for women. For more than a 
century AAUW has worked toward those goals 
by responsible participation in public 
policy issues at local, state, national and 
international levels. AAUW supports 
constitutional protection for the rights of 
all individuals and opposes all forms of 
discrimination. Therefore, AAUW has a 
strong interest in the outcome of this 
case. 
The American Civil Liberties Union 
("ACLU") is a nationwide union, non-
partisan organization of over 250,000 
A-1 
members dedicated to protecting fundamental 
rights, including the right to equal 
treatment under the law. The ACLU has 
established the Women's Rights Project to 
work towards the elimination of the 
pervasive problem of gender-based discri-
mination. It has participated, both 
directly and as amicus curiae, in the 
litigation of many cases before the Supreme 
Court and other courts challenging sex 
discriminatory practices. 
The Employment Law Center, a project 
of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, 
is a private non-profit public interest law 
firm which specializes in employment 
discriminatio~. Founded in 1916 to 
represent individuals unable to afford 
legal counsel, the Employment Law Center is 
dedicated to the eradication of all forms 
of employment discrimination. In the area 
of sex discrimination, the Employment Law 
Center has filed amicus curiae briefs in 
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several cases, including California Federal 
Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra; 
Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors 
of Rotary International; Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education; and Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 
Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. (ERA) is 
a San Francisco-based public interest legal 
and educational corporation dedicated to 
working through the legal system to secure 
equality for women. ERA has a long history 
of interest, activism, and advocacy in all 
areas of the law which affect equality 
between the sexes. ERA has been particu-
larly concerned with gender equality in the 
work force because economic independence is 
fundamental to women's ability to gain 
equality in other aspects of society. If 
sex-role stereotyping may be used to 
exclude women from full participation in 
the marketplace, the dream of equality will 
never be realized. 
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The Institute for Research on Women's 
Health ("IRWH") is the co-sponsor of Sexual 
Harassment and Employment Discrimination 
Against Women, a consumer handbook for 
women who are the victims of employment 
discrimination. The IRWH also sponsors a 
project called "WAGES" (Women's Action for 
Good Employment Standards), which provides 
support to victims of gender-related abuse 
in the workplace. 
The National Bar Association, Women 
Lawyers Division, founded in 1925, is a 
professional membership organization which 
represents more than 10,000 Black attor-
neys, judges and law students. Its 
purposes include protecting the civil and 
political rights of all citizens. The NBA, 
through its Women Lawyers Division, has 
been actively involved in issues concerning 
equal employment opportunity. The Greater 
Washington Area Chapter is particularly 
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dedicated to addressing the needs of women 
in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 
The National Coalition for Women's 
Mental Health is an interdisciplinary 
organization established in 1985 to promote 
a women's health agenda. Our membership 
includes researchers who have contributed 
to the research literature that has 
documented the pervasiveness of gender 
stereotyping in the workplace, and the 
resulting evaluation bias that detracts 
from the recognition of women's achieve-
ments. Its Employment Task Force has 
focused on mental health effects of gender 
stereotyping and sex discrimination in the 
workplace. Along with the Institute for 
Research on Women's Health, the Coalition 
co-sponsored the consumer handbook, Sexual 
Harassment and Sexual Discrimination 
Against Women. The Coalition is honored to 
sign on to the women's group amicus brief 
in this case. 
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The National Conference of Women's Bar 
Associations (NCWBA) is a non-profit 
professional organization of approximately 
98,000 male and female attorneys. Member-
ship is open to all individual state, 
regional, and local women's bar associa-
tions . . The NCWBA was formed in 1981 to 
promote the highest standards of the legal 
profession, to advance justice, to promote 
and protect the interests and welfare of 
women, and to pursue these goals through 
appropriate legal, social, and political 
action. sexual discrimination as well as 
sexual harassment against women in the 
workplace is a common occurrence which 
hinders their full career development and 
advancement. The NCBWA supports efforts to 
assure that every woman be given the 
opportunity to enjoy a working environment 
free from sex discrimination. 
The National Organization for Women 
("NOW") is a national membership organiza-
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tion of approximately 160,000 women and men 
in over 700 chapters throughout the 
country. It is a leading advocate of 
women's equality in all areas of life. NOW 
has as one of its priorities the elimina-
tion of sex-based discrimination in employ-
ment. 
The National Women's Law Center 
("NWLC") is a non-profit legal advocacy 
organization dedicated to the advancement 
and protection of women's rights and the 
corresponding elimination of sex discrimi-
nation from all facets of American life. 
Since 1972, the Center has worked to secure 
equal opportunity in the workplace through 
the full enforcement of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 
other civil rights statutes, and through 
the implementation of effective remedies 
for long standing discrimination against 
women and minorities. 
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The Northwest Women's Law Center is a 
private non-profit organization in Seattle, 
Washington, that works to advance the legal 
rights of women through litigation, 
education, legislative advocacy, and 
providing information and referrals to 
women with legal problems. One of the Law 
Center's priority issue areas is the 
elimination of sex discrimination in 
employment. The Law Center has partici-
pated in several cases involving sex 
discrimination in employment before the 
U.S. Supreme Court including California 
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Guerra and Hishon v. King and Spalding. 
The NOW Legal Defense and Education 
Fund ("NOW LDEF") was founded in 1970 by 
leaders of the National Organization for 
Women as a non-profit civil rights organi-
zation to perform a broad range of legal 
and educational services nationally in 




sex-based discrimination and secure equal 
I! rights. A major goal of the NOW LDEF is 
II 
I: 
II the elimination of barriers that deny women 
1 economic opportunities. Ih furtherance of 
II that goal, NOW LDEF has participated in 
numerous cases to secure full enforcement 




The Organization of Pan Asian-American 
Women ("Pan Asia") is the oldest public 
policy oriented organization focused on 
concerns of Asian and Pacific Islander 
women in the United States. Founded in 
1976, Pan Asia is a national, non-profit 
organization composed of Filipino, Chinese, 
East Indian, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, 
Pacific Islander, and other American women 
of Asian descent. Pan Asia seeks to insure 
full participation of Asian-Pacific 
American women in all aspects of American 
society, particularly in those areas where 




Asian-Pacific American women experience the 
double discrimination of sex and race 
stereotyping. Pan Asia is particularly 
concerned about the "glass ceiling" 
phenomenon as it applies to both sex and 
race job promotions in professional fields. 
The San Francisco Women Lawyers 
Alliance is a bar association comprised of 
women lawyers and other legal professionals 
in the San Francisco Bay Area. The 
organization has filed a number of amicus 
briefs and lobbied for state and local 
legislation affecting economic and employ-
ment opportunities for women and equal 
access to the courts. The Alliance is 
committed to the principle that employment 
decisions should be based on legitimate job 
related criteria and not on gender, 
including sex stereotyping. 
Nadine Taub is the Director of the 
Women's Rights Litigation Clinic and a 







Newark, New Jersey. She has litigated 
extensively in the areas of reproductive 
rights, sexual harassment and equal 
protection generally. Professor Taub is 
the author of Keeping Women In Their Place: 
Stereotyping Per Se As a Form of Employment 
Discrimination, 21 B.C.L.Rev. 345 (1980). 
The Women's Bar Association of the 
District of Columbia is an organization of 
approximately 1600 women and men in the 
legal profession, including many members 
who are partners or who aspire to become 
partners in law firms. As a group commit-
ted to the advancement of women as attor-
neys and judges, the Association believes 
that equal criteria should apply to all 
candidates for promotion. The eradication 
of sex stereotypes from these decisions is 
essential to such progress. 
The Women's Bar Association of 
Massachusetts is an organization of 1000 




promote the professional advancement of 
women attorneys and to address the problems 
that women attorneys face in their profes-
sion and in the workplace. The organiza-
tion also protects and promotes the 
interests of women generally. The WBA 
submits this brief in support of affirmance 
because of WBA's profound concern with the 
prevalence of sex discrimination in the 
workplace. The WBA's participation in 
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, and 
Hishon v. King & Spaulding reflects WBA's 
view that Title VII, and the application of 
the correct burdens of proof in Title VII 
cases are essential to eliminating all 
vestiges of sex discrimination from the 
workplace. 
The Women's Equity Action League 
(WEAL), was founded in 1972 as a national, 
non-profit membership organization spe-
cializing in economic issues affecting 
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women. WEAL sponsors research, education 
projects, litigation and legislative 
advocacy. WEAL is committed to the full 
and effective enforcement of antidiscri-
mination laws at both the federal and state 
levels to assure that all economic oppor-
tunities are available to women as well as 
men. WEAL has appeared as amicus curiae in 
numerous gender discrimination cases before 
this Court such as Arizona Governing 
Committee v. Norris, Roberts v. Jaycees, 
and Grove City College v. Bell. 
Women Employed is a national member-
ship association of working women. Over 
the past fifteen years, the organization 
has assisted thousands of women with 
problems of discrimination, monitored the 
performance of equal employment opportunity 
agencies, analyzed equal employment 
opportunity policies, and developed 
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specific, detailed proposals for improving 
enforcement efforts. 
The Women's Legal Defense Fund is a 
non-profit membership organization founded 
in 1971 to provide pro bone legal assist-
ance to women who have been the victims of 
discrimination based on sex. The Fund 
devotes a major portion of its resources to 
combating sex discrimination in employment 
through litigation of significant employ-
ment discrimination cases, operation of an 
employment discrimination counseling 
program, and advocacy before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and other 
federal agencies charged with enforcement 
of the equal opportunity laws. 
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